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The Ecological Conscience1 is the arresting title of a representative environmen-
tal anthology. The puzzlement lies neither in the noun nor in the by now 
familiar modifier, but in their operation on each other. We are comfortable 
with a Christian or humanist ethic, but the moral noun does not regularly 
take a scientific adjective: a biological conscience, a geological conscience. In 
a celebrated survey, The Subversive Science* where ecology reaches into our 
ultimate commitments, Paul Sears entitles an essay "The Steady State: Phys-
ical Law and Moral Choice." To see how odd, ethically and scientifically, is 
the conjunction, replace homeostasis with gravity or entropy. 
The sense of anomaly will dissipate, though moral urgency may re-
main, if an environmental ethic proves to be only an ethic—utilitarian, 
hedonist, or whatever—about the environment, brought to it, informed con-
cerning it, but not in principle ecologically formed or reformed. This would 
be like medical ethics, which is applied to but not derived from medical 
science,. But we are sometimes promised more, a derivation in which the 
newest bioscience shapes (not to say, subverts) the ethic, a resurgent 
naturalistic ethics. "We must learn that nature includes an intrinsic value 
system," writes Ian McHarg.3  A Daedalus collection is introduced with 
the same conviction: Environmental science "is the building of the structure 
of concepts and natural laws that will enable man to understand his place in 
nature. Such understanding must be one basis of the moral values that guide 
each human generation in exercising its stewardship over the earth. For this 
purpose ecology—the science of interactions among living things and their 
environments—is central."4 We shall presently inquire into the claim that an 
1. Robert Disch, ed.t The Ecological Conscience: Values for Survival (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970). 
2. Paul Sbepard and Daniel McKinley, cds., The Subversive Science (Boston: Ho ugh ton 
Mifflin Co., 1969). 
3. Ian L. McHarg, "Values, Process, and Form," in Disch, p. 21. 
4. Roger Revelle and Hans H. Landsberg, eds., America's Changing Environment (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1970), p. xxii. 
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ecological ultimacy lies in "The Balance of Nature: A Ground for Values." 
Just what sort of traffic is there here between science and morality? 
The boundary between science and ethics is precise if we accept a pair of 
current (though not unargued) philosophical categories: the distinction be-
tween descriptive and prescriptive law. The former, in the indicative, marks 
the realm of science and history. The latter, including always an imperative, 
marks the realm of ethics. The route from one to the other, if any, is perhaps 
the most intransigent issue in moral philosophy, and he who so moves will be 
accused of the naturalistic fallacy. No set of statements of fact by themselves 
entails any evaluative statement, except as some additional evaluative premise 
has been introduced. With careful analysis this evaluation will reappear, the 
ethics will separate out from the science. We shall press this logic on ecologi-
cal ethics. Environmental science describes what is the case. An ethic pre-
scribes what ought to be. But an environmental ethic? If our categories hold, 
perhaps we have a muddle. Or perhaps a paradox that yields light on the 
linkage between facts and values. 
We find representative spokesman for ecological morality not of a single 
mind. But the multiple species can, we suggest, be classified in two genera, 
following two concepts that are offered as moral sources. (A) Prominent in, or 
underlying, those whom we hear first is the connection of homeostasis with 
morality. This issues largely in what we term an ethic that is secondarily 
ecological, (fl) Beyond this, surpassing though not necessarily gainsaying it, 
is the discovery of a moral ought inherent in recognition of the holistic 
character of the ecosystem, issuing in an ethic that is primarily ecological. 
But first, consider an analogue. When advised that we ought to obey the 
laws of health, we analyze the injunction. The laws of health are nonmoral 
and operate inescapably on us. But, circumscribed by them, we have certain 
options: to employ them to our health, or to neglect them ("break them") to 
our hurt. Antecedent to the laws of health, the moral ought reappears in 
some such form as, "You ought not to harm yourself." Similarly the laws of 
psychology, economics, history, the social sciences, and indeed all applied 
sciences describe what is (has been, or may be) the case; but in confrontation 
with human agency, they prescribe what the agent must do if he is to attain a 
desired end. They yield a technical ought related to an if-clause at the agent's 
option. So far they are nonmoral; they become moral only as a moral princi-
ple binds the agent to some end. This, in turn, is transmitted through natural 
law to a proximate moral ought. Let us map this as follows: 
Technical Ought Natural Law Antecedent If-Option 
You ought not to break the        for the laws of health de- if you wish not to harm 
laws of health scribe the conditions  of yourself. 
welfare 
Proximate Moral Ought Natural Law Antecedent Moral Ought 
You ought not to break the        for the laws of health de- and you ought not to harm 
laws of health scribe the conditions of yourself. 
welfare 
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Allow for the moment that (in the absence of overriding considerations) 
prudence is a moral virtue. How far can ecological ethics transpose to an 
analogous format? 
Perhaps the paramount law in ecological theory is that of homeostasis. 
In material, our planetary ecosystem is essentially closed, and life proceeds 
by recycling transformations. In energy, the system is open, with balanced 
solar input and output, the cycling being in energy subsystems of aggrada-
tion and degradation. Homeostasis, it should be noted, is at once an 
achievement and a tendency. Systems recycle, and there is energy balance; 
yet the systems are not static, but dynamic, as the forces that yield equilib-
rium are in flux, seeking equilibrium yet veering from it to bring counter-
forces into play. This perpetual stir, tending to and deviating from equilib-
rium, drives the evolutionary process, 
1. How does this translate morally? Let us consider first a guarded 
translation. In "The Steady State: Physical Law and Moral Choice," Paul 
Sears writes: "Probably men will always differ as to what constitutes the 
good life. They need not differ as to what is necessary for the long survival of 
man on earth. Assuming that this is our wish, the conditions are clear 
enough. As living beings we must come to terms with the environment about 
us, learning to get along with the liberal budget at our disposal, promoting 
rather than disrupting those great cycles of nature—of water movement, 
energy flow, and material transformation that have made life itself possible. 
As a physical goal, we must seek to attain what I have called a steady state."5 
The title of the article indicates that this is a moral umust." To assess this 
argument, begin with the following: 
Technical Ought Ecological Law Antecedent If-Option 
You ought to recycle for the life-supporting eco-        if you wish to preserve 
system recycles or perishes        human life. 
When we replace the if-option by an antecedent moral ought, we con-
vert the technical ought to a proximate moral ought. Thus the "must" in the 
citation is initially one of physical necessity describing our circumscription 
by ecological law, and subsequently it is one of moral necessity when this law 
is conjoined with the life-promoting ought. 
Proximate Moral Ought Ecological Law Antecedent Moral Ought 
You ought to recycle for the life-supporting eco-        and you ought to preserve 
system recycles or perishes        human life. 
The antecedent ought Sears takes, fairly enough, to be common to many if 
not all our moral systems. Notice the sense in which we can break ecological 
law. Spelling-the conditions of stability and instability, homeostatic laws 
5. Shepard and McKinley, p. 401. 
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operate on us willy-nilly, but within a necessary obedience we have options, 
some of which represent enlightened obedience. To break an ecological law, 
means then, to disregard its implications in regard to an antecedent moral 
ought. 
Thus far ecological morality is informed about the environment, con-
forming to it, but is not yet an ethic in which environmental science affects 
principles. Antecedent to ecological input, there is a classical ethical princi-
ple, "promoting human life," which, when ecologically tutored, better un-
derstands life's circulations, whether in homeostasis, or in DDT, or stron-
tium 90. Values do not (have to) lie in the world but may be imposed on it, as 
man prudentially manages the world. 
2. Much attention has focused on a 1968 address, "The Tragedy of the 
Commons," given by Garrett Hardin to the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science. Hardin's argument, recently expanded to book 
length, proposes an ecologically based "fundamental extension in morality."6 
While complex in its ramifications and deserving of detailed analysis, the 
essential ethic is simple, built on the model of a village commons, Used by 
the villagers to graze cattle, the commons is close to its carrying capacity. 
Any villager who does not increase his livestock will be disadvantaged in the 
market. Following self-interest, each increases his herd; and the commons is 
destroyed. Extended to the planet, seen as a homeostatic system of finite 
resources the model's implication of impending tragedy is obvious. (The 
propriety of the extrapolation is arguable, but not at issue here.) The pre-
scription of an ecological morality is "mutual coercion, mutually agreed on" 
in which we limit freedom to grow in order to stabilize the ecosystem to the 
mutual benefit of all. 
To distill the ethics here is not difficult. We begin as before, with 
ecological law that yields options, which translate morally only with the 
addition of the life-promoting obligation. 
Technical Ought Ecological Law Antecedent If-Option 
We ought to stabilize the        for the life-supporting eco-        if we wish mutually to pre-
ecosystem thru mutually        system stabilizes at a finite        serve human life, imposed  
limited  growth                     carrying capacity or is destroyed 
Proximate Moral Ought Ecological Law Antecedent Moral Ought 
We ought to stabilize the        for the life-supporting eco-        and we ought mutually 
ecosystem thru mutually        system stabilizes at a finite        to preserve human life. 
imposed self-limited growth   carrying capacity or is destroyed 
To clarify the problem of mutual preservation, Hardin uses an essentially 
Hobbesian scheme. Every man is an ego set over against the community, 
acting in his own self-interest. But to check his neighbor's aggrandizement, 
he compromises and enters a social contract where, now acting in enlight- 
6. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162 (1968): 1243-48. 
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ened self-interest; he limits his own freedom to grow in return for a limitation 
of the encroaching freedom of his competitors. The result is surprisingly 
atomistic and anthropocentric, recalling the post-Darwinian biological 
model, lacking significant place for the mutal interdependence and symbiotic 
cooperation so prominent in recent ecology. In any event, it is clear enough 
that Hardin's environmental ethic is only a classical ethic applied in the 
matrix of ecological limitations. 
Typically, ecological morality generated by population pressure re-
solves itself into a particular case of this kind, as for instance in the analysis of 
Paul Ehrlich in The Population Bomb .This is an ethic of scarcity, but morality 
since its inception has been conceived in scarcity. 
3, Let us pass to a more venturesome translation of homeostasis into 
moral prescription, that of Thomas B. Colwell, Jr. "The balance of Nature 
provides an objective normative model which can be utilized as the ground of 
human value. . . . Nor does the balance of Nature serve as the source of all 
our values. It is only the ground of whatever other values we may develop. 
But these other values must be consistent with it. The balance of Nature is, 
in other words, a kind of ultimate value. . . .  It is a natural norm, not a 
product of human convention or supernatural authority. It says in effect to 
man: 'This much at least you must do, this much you must be responsible 
for. You must at least develop and utilize energy systems which recycle their 
products back into Nature.'. . . Human values are founded in objectively 
determinable ecological relations with Nature. The ends which we propose 
must be such as to be compatible with the ecosystems of Nature."7 
Morality and homeostasis are clearly blended here, but it is not so clear 
how we relate or disentangle them. Much is embedded in the meanings of 
"ground of human value," "ultimate value," the mixed moral and physical 
"must," and the identification of a moral norm with a natural limit. Let us 
mark out first a purely technical ought, followed by an antecedent moral 
ought which may convert to a proximate moral ought. 
Technical Ought Ecological Law Antecedent If-Option 
You ought tq, recycle for the value-supporting if you wish to preserve 
ecosystem recycles or the ground of human value. 
perishes 
Proximate Moral Ought Ecological Law Antecedent Moral Ought 
You ought to recycle for the value-supporting and you ought to preserve 
ecosystem recycles or the ground of human value. 
perishes 
The simplest reading of Colwell is to hold, despite his exaggerated terms, 
that the "ground of human value" means only the limiting condition, itself 
value free, within which values are to be constructed. Homeostasis is not "an 
ultimate value," only a precondition of the value enterprise, necessary but 
7. Thomas B. Colwell, Jr., "The Balance of Nature: A Ground for Human Values,*' Main 
Currents in Modem Thought 26 (1969): 50. 
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not sufficient for value. But then it is misleading to say that "human values 
have a root base in ecological relationships." For homeostasis, like scarce 
resources, or the cycling seasons, or soil characteristics, or the conservation 
of matter-energy, is a natural given, the stage on which the value-drama is 
played. 
If, seeking to manage my finances wisely, I ask, "How shall I spend my 
money?" and you counsel, "You ought to balance your budget," the advice is 
sound enough, yet only preparatory to serious discussion of economic values. 
The balanced budget is necessary but not sufficient for value, a ground of 
value only in an enabling, not a fundamental sense; certainly not what we 
would ordinarily call an ultimate value. It is true, of course, that the means to 
any end can, in contexts of desperation and urgency, stand in short focus as 
ultimate values, Air, food, water, health, if we are deprived of them, become 
at once our concern. Call them ultimate values if you wish, but the ultimacy 
is instrumental, not intrinsic. We should think him immature whose princi-
pal goal was just to breathe, to eat, to drink, to be healthy—merely this and 
nothing more. We would judge a society stagnant whose ultimate goal was 
but to recycle. To say that the balance of nature is a ground for human values 
is not to draw any ethics from ecology, as may first appear, but only to 
recognize the necessary medium of ethical activity. 
Thus far, ecological ethics reduces rather straightforwardly to the classi-
cal ethical query now advised of certain ecological boundaries. The stir is, to 
put it so, about the boundedness, not the morality. The ultimate science may 
well herald limits to growth; it challenges certain presumptions about rising 
standards of living, capitalism, progress, development, and so on; convic-
tions that, though deeply entrenched parameters of human value, are issues 
of what is, can, or will be the case, not of what ought to be. This realization 
of limits, dramatically shift ethical application though it may, can hardly be 
said to reform our ethical roots, for the reason that its scope remains (when 
optimistic) a maximizing of human values or (when pessimistic) human sur-
vival. All goods are human goods, with nature an accessory. There is no 
endorsement of any natural Tightness, only the acceptance of the natural 
given. It is ^ecological secondarily, but primarily anthropological. 
The claim that morality is a derivative of the holistic character of the 
ecosystem proves more radical, for the ecological perspective penetrates not 
only the secondary but also the primary qualities of the ethic. It is ecological 
in substance, not merely in accident; it is ecological per se, not just conse-
quentially. 
Return, for instance, to Colwell. He seems to mean more than the 
minimal interpretation just given him. The mood is that the ecological cir-
cumscription of value is not itself amoral or premoral, neatly articulated from 
morality. Construct values though man may, he operates in an environmen-
tal context where he must ground his values in ecosystemic obedience. This 
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umust" is ecologically descriptive: certain laws in fact circumscribe him and 
embrace his value enterprises. And it is also morally prescriptive: given 
options within parameters of necessary obedience, he morally ought to pro-
mote homeostasis. But here, advancing on the preceding argument, the claim 
seems to be that following ecological nature is not merely a prudential means 
to moral and valuational ends independent of nature but is an end in itself; or, 
more accurately, it is within man's relatedness to his environment that all 
man's values are grounded and supported. In that construction of values, 
man doubtless exceeds any environmental prescription, but nevertheless his 
values remain environmental reciprocals. They complement a homeostatic 
world. His valuations, like his other perceptions and knowings, are interac-
tionary, drawn from environmental transactions, not merely brought to it. In 
this environmental encounter, he finds homeostasis a key to all values—the 
precondition of values, if you will—but one which, for all that, informs and 
shapes his other values by making them relational, corporate, environmental. 
But we are passing over to moral endorsement of the ecosystemic character, 
and to a tenor of argument that others make clearer. 
Perhaps the most provocative such affirmation is in a deservedly seminal 
essay, "The Land Ethic," by Aldo Leopold. He concludes, "A thing is right 
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."8 Leopold writes in search 
of a morality of land use that escapes economic expediency. He too enjoins, 
proximately, recycling, but it is clear that his claim transcends the immediate 
context to teach that we morally ought to preserve the excellences of the 
ecosystem (or, more freely as we shall interpret him, to maximize the integ-
rity, beauty, and stability of the ecosystem). He is seeking, as he says, to 
advance the ethical frontier from the merely interpersonal to the region of 
man in transaction with his environment. 
Here the environmental perspective enters not simply at the level of the 
proximate ought which, environmentally informed and preceded by 
homocentrist moral principles, prescribes protection of the ecosystem. It acts 
at a higher level, as itself an antecedent ought, from which proximate oughts, 
such as the one earlier considered, about recycling, may be derived. 
Proximate Moral Ought Ecological Law Antecedent Moral Ought 
You ought to recycle for recycling preserves the and you ought to preserve 
ecosystem the integrity of the ecosys- 
tem. 
Note how the antecedent parallels upper-level axioms in other systems (e.g., 
"You ought to maximize human good," or "You ought not to harm yourself 
or others," or "Love your neighbor as yourself "). Earlier, homeostatic con-
nectedness did not really alter the moral focus; but here, in a shift of 
paradigms, the values hitherto reserved for man are reallocated to man in the 
environment. 
8. Aldo Leopold, "The Land Ethic," in A Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1949), pp. 201-26. 
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Doubtless even Leopold's antecedent ought depends on a yet prior 
ought that one promote beauty and integrity, wherever he finds it. But this, 
like the injunction that one ought to promote the good, or that one ought to 
keep his promises, is so high level as to be, if not definitional or analytic, so 
general as to be virtually unarguable and therefore without any real theoreti-
cal content. Substantive values emerge only as something empirical is 
specified as the locus of value. In Leopold's case we have a feedback from 
ecological science which, prior to any effect on proximate moral oughts, 
informs the antecedent ought. There is a valuational element intrinsically 
related to the concepts utilized in ecological description. That is, the character 
of what is right in some basic sense, not just in application, is stated 
postecologically. Doubtless too, the natural course we choose to preserve is 
filtered through our concepts of beauty, stability, and integrity, concepts 
whose origins are not wholly clear and which are perhaps nonnatural. But, 
perspectival though this invariably is, what counts as beauty and integrity is 
not just brought to and imposed on the ecosystem but is discovered there. 
Let us map this as follows: 
Proximate Moral              Ecological Law Antecedent Moral Ecosystemic 
Ought  Ought Evaluation 
You ought to recycle for recycling pre- and you ought to for the integral eco- 
serves the integral preserve the integrity system has value. 
ecosystem of the ecosystem 
Our antecedent ought is not eco-free. Though preceding ecological law in the 
sense that, given this ought, one can transmit it via certain ecological laws to 
arrive at proximate oughts, it is itself a result of an ecosystemic appraisal. 
This evaluation is not scientific description; hence not ecology per se, 
but metaecology. No amount of research can verify that the right is the 
optimum biotic community. Yet ecological description generates this evalua-
tion of nature, endorsing the systemic Tightness. The transition from "is" to 
"good" and thence to "ought" occurs here; we leave science to enter the 
domain of evaluation, from which an ethic follows. The injunction to recycle 
is technical, made under circumscription by ecological necessity and made 
moral only by the presence of an antecedent. The injunction to maximize the 
ecosystemic excellence is also ecologically derived but is an evaluative transi-
tion which is not made under necessity. 
Our account initially suggests that ecological description is logically (if 
not chronologically) prior to the ecosystemic evaluation, the former generat-
ing the latter. But the connection of description with evaluation is more 
complex, for the description and evaluation to some extent arise together, 
and it is often difficult to say which is prior and which is subordinate. 
Ecological description finds unity, harmony, interdependence, stability, 
etc., and these are valuationally endorsed, yet they are found, to some ex-
tent, because we search with a disposition to value order, harmony, stability, 
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unity. Still, the ecological description does not merely confirm these values, 
it informs them; and we find that the character, the empirical content, of 
order, harmony, stability is drawn from, no less than brought to, nature. In 
post-Darwinian nature, for instance, we looked for these values in vain, 
while with ecological description we now find them; yet the earlier data are 
not denied, only redescribed or set in a larger ecological context, and some-
where enroute our notions of harmony, stability, etc., have shifted too and 
we see beauty now where we could not see it before. What is ethically 
puzzling, and exciting, in the marriage and mutual transformation of ecologi-
cal description and evaluation is that here an "ought" is not so much derived 
from an "is" as discovered simultaneously with it. As we progress from 
descriptions of fauna and flora, of cycles and pyramids, of stability and 
dynamism, on to intricacy, planetary opulence and interdependence, to 
unity and harmony with oppositions in counterpoint and synthesis, arriving 
at length at beauty and goodness, it is difficult to say where the natural facts 
leave off and where the natural values appear. For some observers at least, 
the sharp is/ought dichotomy is gone; the values seem to be there as soon as 
the facts are fully in, and both alike are properties of the system. 
While it is frequently held that the basic criterion of the obligatory is the 
nonmoral value that is produced or sustained, there is novelty in what is 
taken as the nonmoral good—the ecosystem. Our ethical heritage largely 
attaches values and rights to persons, and if nonpersonal realms enter, they 
enter only as tributary to the personal. What is proposed here is a broadening 
of value, so that nature will cease to be merely "property" and become a 
commonwealth. The logic by which goodness is discovered or appreciated is 
notoriously evasive, and we can only reach it suggestively. "Ethics cannot be 
put into words," said Wittgenstein, such things "make themselves manifest."9 
We have a parallel, retrospectively, in the checkered advance of the ethical 
frontier recognizing intrinsic goodness, and accompanying rights, outside the 
self. If we now universalize "person," consider how slowly the circle has 
been enlarged fully to include aliens, strangers, infants, children, Negroes, 
Jews, slaves, women, Indians, prisoners, the elderly, the insane, the de-
formed, and even now we ponder the status of fetuses. Ecological ethics 
queries whether we ought again to universalize, recognizing the intrinsic 
value of every ecobiotic component. 
Are there, first, existing ethical sentiments that are subecological, that 
is, which anticipate the ecological conscience, and on which we might build? 
Second, is the ecological evaluation authentic, or perhaps only a remodeled 
traditional humanist ethic? Lastly, what are the implications of maximizing 
the ecosystem, and what concept of nature warrants such evaluation? 
1. Presumably the evaluation of a biotic community will rest partly on 
the worth of its elements, if not independently, then in matrix. We have a 
long-standing, if (in the West) rather philosophically neglected, tradition that 
9. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Pbilosopbicus, trans, D. F. Pears and B. F. 
McGuiness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 6:421, 522. 
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grants some moral ought to the prevention of needless animal suffering: "A 
righteous man has regard for the life of his beasts" (Proverbs 12.10). Consider 
what we oddly call "humane" societies or laws against cockfighting, bear 
baiting, and (in our nation) bullfighting, and (in most states) steer busting. 
We prohibit a child's torture of a cat; we prosecute the rancher who carelessly 
lets horses starve. Even the hunter pursues a wounded deer. That one ought 
to prevent needless cruelty has no obvious ecological foundation, much less 
a natural one, but the initial point is that animals are so far endowed with a 
value that conveys something like rights, or at least obligates us. 
More revelatory is the increasingly common claim that one ought not to 
destroy life, or species, needlessly, regardless of suffering, We prevent the 
wanton slaughter of eagles, whether they suffer or not. Even the zealous 
varmint hunter seems to need the rationalization that crows rob the cornfield. 
He must malign the coyote and wolf to slay them enthusiastically. He cannot 
kill just for fun. We abhor the oilspills that devastate birdlife. The Sierra 
Club defends the preservation of grizzlies or whooping cranes on many 
counts as means to larger ends—as useful components of the ecosystem, for 
scientific study, or for our children's enjoyment. (We shall return to the 
integrated character of such argument.) But sufficiently pressed, the defense 
is that one ought not destroy a life form of beauty. Since ecosystems regu-
larly eliminate species, this may be a nonecological ought. Yet it is not clearly 
so, for part of a species' evaluation arises as it is seen in environmental matrix. 
Meanwhile, we admit they should continue to exist, "as a matter of biotic 
right."10 
This caliber of argument can be greatly extended. A reason given for the 
preservation of Cades Cove in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park is 
the variety of rare salamanders there. Certain butterflies occur rarely in 
isolated hummocks in the African grasslands. Formerly, unscrupulous col-
lectors would collect a few hundred then burn out the hummock to destroy 
the species, and thereby drive up the price of their collections. I find myself 
persuaded that they morally ought not do this. Nor will the reason resolve 
into the evil of greed, but it remains the needless destruction of even a 
butterfly species. At scattered occurrences of rare ferns in Tennessee I re-
fused to collect, not simply to leave them for others to enjoy, but morally 
unwilling to imperil a species. Such species are a fortiori environmentally 
pressed, yet they remain, and even prosper, in selected environmental 
niches, and their dispatch by human whim seems of a different order from 
their elimination by natural selection—something like the difference between 
murder and death by natural causes. 
This respect enlarges to the landscape. We preserve certain features of 
natural beauty—the Grand Canyon, or Rainbow Bridge, or the Everglades. 
Though it seems odd to accord them "rights" (for proposals to confer rights 
on some new entity always sound linguistically odd), we go so far as to say 
10. Leopold, p. 211. 
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that, judged to be places of beauty or wonder, they ought to be preserved. Is 
this only as a means to an end, that we and others may enjoy them? The 
answer is complex. At least some argue that, as with persons, they are 
somehow violated, even prostituted, if treated merely as means; we enjoy 
them very largely for what they are in themselves, To select some landscapes 
is not to judge the omitted ones valueless. They may be sacrificed to higher 
values, or perhaps selected environments are judged sufficiently representa-
tive of more abundant ones. That we do preserve any landscape indicates our 
discovery of value there, with its accompanying ought. Nor are such envi-
ronments only the hospitable ones. We are increasingly drawn to the beauty 
of wilderness, desert, tundra, the arctic, and the sea. Planetary forces ever 
reshape landscapes, of course, and former environments are now extinct; 
nevertheless, we find in extant landscapes an order of beauty that we are 
unwilling to destroy. 
2. Do we perhaps have, even in this proposed primary ecological ethic, 
some eco-free ought? If Leopold's preserving the ecosystem is merely ancil-
lary to human interests, the veiled antecedent ought is still that we ought to 
maximize human good. Were we so to maximize the ecosystem we should 
have a corporate anthropological egoism, "human chauvinism," not a plane-
tary altruism. The optimum ecosystem would be but a prudential means to 
human welfare, and our antecedent ought would no longer be primarily 
ecological, but as before, simply a familiar one, incidentally ecological in its 
prudence. 
Even when richly appreciative of nature's values, much ecological 
moralizing does in fact mix the biosystemic welfare with an appeal to human 
interests. Reminiscent of Leopold, Réné Dubos suggests extending the 
Decalogue with an eleventh commandment, "Thou shalt strive for environ-
mental quality." The justification may have a "resources" cast. We preserve 
wilderness and the maximally diverse ecosystem for reasons scientific and 
aesthetic. Natural museums serve as laboratories. Useless species may later 
be found useful. Diversity insures stability, especially if we err and our 
monocultures trigger environmental upset. Wild beauty adds a spiritual qual-
ity to life. "Were it only for selfish reasons, therefore, we must maintain 
variety and harmony in nature, . . . Wilderness is not a luxury; it is a 
necessity for the protection of humanized nature and for the preservation of 
mental health."11 
But the "were it only . . ."  indicates that such reasons, if sufficient, are 
not ultimate. Deeper, nonselfish reasons respect "qualities inherent" in 
fauna, flora, landscape, "so as to foster their development." Haunting West-
ern civilization is "the criminal conceit that nature is to be considered primar-
ily as a source of raw materials and energy for human purposes," "the crude 
belief that man is the only value to be considered in managing the world and 
that the rest of nature can be thoughtlessly sacrificed to his welfare and 
11. Rene Dubos, A God Within (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), pp. 166-67. 
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whims." While holding that man is the creature who humanizes nature, the 
ecological conscience is sensitive to other worth. Indeed, somewhat paradox-
ically, it is only as man grants an intrinsic integrity to nature that he discov-
ers his truest interests. "An enlightened anthropocentrism acknowledges 
that, in the long run, the world's good always coincides with man's own most 
meaningful good. Man can manipulate nature to his best interests only if he 
first loves her for her own sake."12 
This coincidence of human and ecosystemic interests, frequent in en-
vironmental thought, is ethically confusing but fertile. To reduce ecological 
concern merely to human interests does not really exhaust the moral temper 
here, and only as we appreciate this will we see the ethical perspective 
significantly altered. That alteration centers in the dissolution of any firm 
boundary between man and the world. Ecology does not know an encapsu-
lated ego over against his environment. Listen, for instance, to Paul Shepard: 
"Ecological thinking, on the other hand, requires a kind of vision across 
boundaries. The epidermis of the skin is ecologically like a pond surface or a 
forest soil, not a shell so much as a delicate interpenetration. It reveals the self 
ennobled and extended, rather than threatened, as part of the landscape, 
because the beauty and complexity of nature are continuous with 
ourselves."13 Man's vascular system includes arteries, veins, rivers, oceans, 
and air currents. Cleaning a dump is not different in kind from filling a tooth. 
The self metabolically, if metaphorically, interpenetrates the ecosystem. The 
world is my body. 
This mood frustrates and ultimately invalidates the effort to understand 
all ecological ethics as disguised human self-interest, for now, with the self 
expanded into the system, their interests merge. One may, from a limited 
perspective, maximize the systemic good to maximize human good, but one 
can hardly say that the former is only a means to the latter, since they both 
amount to the same thing differently described. We are acquainted with 
egoism, egoisme a deux, trots, quatres, with familial and tribal egoism. But here 
is an egotime a la systeme, as the very etymology of "ecology" witnesses: the 
earth is one's household. In this planetary confraternity, there is a confluence 
of egoism .and altruism. Or should we say that egoism is transformed into 
ecoism? To advocate the interests of the system as a means of promoting the 
interests of man (in an appeal to industry and to congressmen) is to operate 
with a limited understanding. If we wish, for rhetorical or pragmatic reasons, 
we may begin with maximizing human good. But when ecologically tutored, 
we see that this can be redescribed as maximizing the ecosystem. Our classi-
cal ought has been transformed, stretched, coextensively with an ecosystemic 
ought. 
To illustrate, ponder the observation that biotic-environmental com-
plexity is integrally related to the richness of human life. That the stability 
and integrity of an ecosystem is a function of its variety and diversity is a 
12. Ibid,, pp. 40-41, 45, 
13. Shepard, p. 2. 
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fairly well-established point; and it is frequently observed that complex life 
forms evolve only in complex environments. The long evolution of man, 
accordingly, has been possible only under the stimulation of many 
environments—marine, arboreal, savannah, tropical, temperate, even arc-
tic. Even when man lives at a distance from some of these, they remain 
tributary to his life support. Without oceans, forests, and grasslands, human 
life would be imperiled. Thus man's complex life is a product of and is 
underlain by environmental complexity. 
This complexity is not simply biological but also mental and cultural. 
For maximum noetic development, man requires an environmental exuber-
ance. So Shepard eloquently introduces the "universal wisdom" of The Sub-
versive Science: 
Internal complexity, as the mind of a primate, is an extension of natural complexity, 
measured by the variety of plants and animals and the variety of nerve cells—organic 
extensions of each other. The exuberance of kinds as the setting in which a good mind 
could evolve (to deal with a complex, world) was not only a past condition. Man did 
not arrive in the world as though disembarking from a train in the city. He continues 
to arrive. . . . This idea of natural complexity as a counterpart to human intricacy is 
central to an ecology of man. The creation of order, of which man is an example, is 
realized also in the number of species and habitats, an abundance of landscapes lush 
and poor. Even deserts and tundras increase the planetary opulence. . . . Reduction 
of this variegation would, by extension then, be an amputation of man. To convert all 
"wastes"—all deserts, estuaries, tundras, ice-fields, marshes, steppes and moors 
—into cultivated fields and cities would impoverish rather than enrich life esthetically 
as well as ecologically.14 
Mountains have both physical and psychic impact. Remove eagles from the 
sky and we will suffer a spiritual loss. For every landscape, there is an 
inscape; mental and environmental horizons reciprocate. 
This supports, but only by curiously transforming, the preservation of 
the ecosystem in human self-interest, for the "self has been so extended as to 
be ecosystemically redefined. The human welfare which we find in the en-
riched ecosystem is no longer recognizable as that of anthropocentrism. Man 
judges the ecosystem as "good" or "bad" not in short anthropocentric focus, 
but with enlarged perspective where the integrity of other species enriches 
him. The moral posture here recalls more familiar (if frequently unsettled) 
ethical themes: that self-interest and benevolence are not necessarily incom-
patible, especially where one derives personal fulfillment from the welfare of 
others; that treating the object of ethical concern as an end in itself is uplift-
ing; that one's own integrity is enhanced by recognition of other integrities. 
3. This environmental ethic is subject both to limits and to develop-
ment, and a fair appraisal ought to recognize both. As a partial ethical source, 
it does not displace functioning social-personal codes, but brings into the 
scope of ethical transaction a realm once regarded as intrinsically valueless 
14. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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and governed largely by expediency. The new ethical parameter is not abso-
lute but relative to classical criteria, Such extension will amplify conflicts of 
value, for human goods must now coexist with environmental goods. In 
operational detail this will require a new casuistry. Mutually supportive 
though the human and the ecosystemic interests may be, conflicts between 
individuals and parties, the rights of the component members of the ecosys-
tem, the gap between the real and the ideal, will provide abundant quan-
daries. 
Further, interpreting charitably, we are not asked to idolize the whole 
except as it is understood as a cosmos in which the corporate vision surrounds 
and limits, but does not suppress the individual. The focus does not only 
enlarge from man to other ecosystemic members, but from individuals of 
whatever kind to the system. Values are sometimes personalized; here the 
community holds values. This is not, of course, without precedent, for we 
now grant values to states, nations, churches, trusts, corporations, and com-
munities. And they hold these values because of their structure in which 
individuals are beneficiaries. It is similar with the ecosystem, only more so; 
for when we recall its diffusion of the boundary between the individual and 
the ecosystem, we cannot say whether value in the system or in the indi-
vidual is logically prior. 
Leopold and Shepard do not mean to deep freeze the present ecosystem. 
Despite their preservationist vocabulary, their care for the biosystemic wel-
fare allows for "alteration, management, and use."15 We are not committed 
to this as the best possible ecosystem; it may well be that the role of man—at 
once "citizen" and "king"—is to govern what has hitherto been the partial 
success of the evolutionary process. Though we revere the earth, we may yet 
"humanize" it, a point made forcefully by Réné Dubos.16 This permits 
interference with and rearrangement of nature's spontaneous course. It en-
joins domestication, for part of the natural richness is its potential in human 
life support. We recognize man's creativity, development, openness, and 
dynamism. 
Species regularly enter and exit nature's theater; perhaps natural selec-
tion currently tests species for their capacity to coexist with man. Orogenic 
and erosional forces have produced perpetual environmental flux; man may 
well transform his environment. But this should complement the beauty, 
integrity, and stability of the planetary biosystem, not do violence to it. 
There ought to be some rational showing that the alteration is enriching; that 
values are sacrificed for greater ones. For this reason the right is not that 
which maintains the ecosystemic status quo, but that which preserves its 
beauty, stability, and integrity. 
What ought to be does not invariably coincide with what is; neverthe-
less, here is a mood that, recalling etymology again, we can best describe as 
man's being "at home" in his world. He accepts, cherishes his good earth. 
15. Leopold, p. 204. 
16. Dubos, chap. 8. 
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Purely scientific descriptions of an ecosystem may warrant the term "stabil-
ity," neutrally used; they facilitate the estimate of its beauty and integrity. 
Added, though, is a response of the ecologist to his discoveries, an evocation 
of altering consciousness. We see integrity and beauty we missed before, 
partly through new realization of fact—interdependence, environmental 
fitness, hydrologic cycles, population rhythms, and feedback loops—and 
partly through transformed concepts of what counts as beauty and integrity, 
for world and concept mutually transform each other. 
Though the full range of that shifting concept of nature and the ecologi-
cal description which underlies it are beyond our scope, we can suggest their 
central axis, After Darwin (through misunderstanding him, perhaps), the 
world of design collapsed, and nature, for all its law, seemed random, acci-
dental, chaotic, blind, crude, an "odious scene of violence."17 Environmental 
science has been resurveying the post-Darwinian natural jungle and has 
increasingly set its conflicts within a dynamic web of life. Nature's savagery 
is much less wanton and clumsy than formerly supposed, and we are invited 
to see the ecosystem not merely in awe, but in "love, respect, and 
admiration."18 Ecological thinking "moves us to silent wonder and glad 
affirmation."19 Oppositions remain in ecological models, but in counter-
point. The system resists the very life it supports; indeed it is by resistance 
not less than environmental conductivity that life is stimulated. The integrity 
of species and individual is a function of a field where fullness lies in inter-
locking predation and symbiosis, construction and destruction, aggradation 
and degradation. The planet that Darrow characterized, in the post-
Darwinian heyday, as a miserable little "wart"20 in the universe, eminently 
unsuited to life, especially human life, is now a sheltered oasis in space. Its 
harmony is often strange, and it is not surprising that in our immaturity we 
mistook it, yet it is an intricate and delicate harmony nevertheless. 
Man, an insider, is not spared environmental pressures, yet, in the full 
ecosystemic context, his integrity is supported by and rises from transaction 
with his world and therefore requires a corresponding dignity in his world 
partner. Of late, the world has ceased to threaten, save as we violate it. How 
starkly this gainsays the alienation that characterizes modern literature, see-
ing nature as basically rudderless, antipathetical, in need of monitoring and 
repair. More typically modern man, for all his technological prowess, has 
found himself distanced from nature, increasingly competent and decreas-
ingly confident, at once distinguished and aggrandized, yet afloat on and 
adrift in an indifferent, if not a hostile universe. His world is at best a huge 
filling station; at worst a prison, or "nothingness." Not so for ecological man; 
confronting his world with deference to a community of value in which he 
17. John Stuart Mill, "Nature," in Collected Works (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1969), 10:398. The phrase characterizes Mill's estimate of nature. 
18. Leopold, p. 223. 
19. Snepard, p. 10. 
20. Clarence Darrow, The Story of My Life (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), p. 
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shares, he is at home again, The new mood is epitomized, somewhat surpris-
ingly, in reaction to space exploration, prompted by vivid photography of 
earth and by astronaut's nostalgia, generating both a new love for Spaceship 
Earth and a resolution to focus on reconciliation with it. 
We shall surely not vindicate the natural sequence in every detail as 
being productive of ecosystemic health, and therefore we cannot simplify our 
ethic to an unreflective acceptance of what naturally is the case. We do not 
live in Eden, yet the trend is there, as ecological advance increasingly finds in 
the natural given stability, beauty, and integrity, and we are henceforth as 
willing to open our concepts to reformation by the world as to prejudge the 
natural order. The question of evolution as it governs our concept of nature is 
technically a separate one. We must judge the worth of the extant ecosystem 
independently of its origins. To do otherwise would be to slip into the 
genetic fallacy. A person has rights for what he is, regardless of his ancestry; 
and it may well be that an ignoble evolutionary process has issued in a 
present ecosystem in which we rightly rejoice. No one familiar with paleon-
tology is likely to claim that the evolutionary sequence moves unfailingly and 
without loss toward an optimally beautiful and stable ecosystem. Yet many 
ecological mechanisms are also evolutionary, and the ecological reappraisal 
suggests as a next stage an evolutionary redescription, in which we think 
again whether evolutionary history, for all its groping, struggle, mutation, 
natural selection, randomness, and statistical movement, does not yield di-
rection enough to ponder that nature has been enriching the ecosystem. The 
fossil record is all of ruins. We survey it first with a certain horror; but then 
out of the ruins emerges this integral ecosystem. He who can be persuaded of 
this latter truth will have an even more powerful ecological ethic, for the 
injunction to maximize the ecosystemic excellences will be an invitation to 
get in gear with the way the universe is operating. Linking his right to 
nature's processes, he will have, at length, an authentic naturalistic ethic. 
The perils of transposing from a new science to a world view, patent in 
the history of scientific thought, are surpassed only by the perils of omitting 
to do so. Granted that we yet lack a clear account of the logic by which we 
get our values, it seems undeniable that we shape them in significant measure 
in accord with our notion of the kind of universe that we live. in. Science has 
in centuries before us upset those values by reappraising the character of the 
universe. One has but to name Copernicus and Newton, in addition to our 
observation that we have lately lived in the shadow of Darwin. The ecologi-
cal revolution may be of a similar order; it is undeniably at work reilluminat-
ing the world. 
Darwin, though, often proves more fertile than his interpreters. When, 
in TheDesenit of Man, he traces the natural history of man's noblest attribute, 
the moral sense, he observes that "the standard of his morality rises higher 
and higher." Initially each attended his self-interest. The growth of con-
science has been a continual expansion of the objects of his "social instincts 
and sympathies," first to family and tribe; then he "regarded more and more, 
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not only the welfare, but the happiness of all his fellow-men;" then "his 
sympathies became more tender and widely diffused, extending to men of all 
races, to the imbecile, maimed, and other useless members of society, and 
finally to the lower animals.. . ."21 After the fauna, can we add the flora, the 
landscape, the seascape, the ecosystem? There would be something 
magnificent about an evolution of conscience that circumscribed the whole. 
If so, Leopold lies in the horizon of Darwin's vision. Much of the search for 
an ecological morality will, perhaps in necessary pragmatism, remain 
secondary, "conservative," where the ground is better charted, and where we 
mix ethics, science, and human interests under our logical control. But we 
judge the ethical frontier to be beyond, a primary revaluing where, in ethical 
creativity, conscience must evolve. The topography is largely uncharted; to 
cross it will require the daring, and caution, of a community of scientists and 
ethicists who can together map both the ecosystem and the ethical grammar 
appropriate for it. 
Perhaps the cash value is the same whether our ethic is ecological in 
secondary or primary senses; yet in the latter I find appeal enough that it has 
my vote to be so if it can. To the one, man may be driven while he still fears 
the world that surrounds him. To the other, he can only be drawn in love. 
21. Charles Darwin, Tbe Descent of Man, new ed. (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1895), 
pp. 124-25. 
